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Abstract: In this work, we used a sensor-based True Random Number Generator in order to generate
keys for a stream cipher based on a recently published hybrid algorithm mixing Skew Tent Map
and a Linear Feedback Shift Register. The stream cipher was implemented and tested in a Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and was able to generate 8-bit width data streams at a clock
frequency of 134 MHz, which is fast enough for Gigabit Ethernet applications. An exhaustive
cryptanalysis was completed, allowing us to conclude that the system is secure. The stream cipher
was compared with other chaotic stream ciphers implemented on similar platforms in terms of area,
power consumption, and throughput.
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1. Introduction
Due to the necessity of encrypting high amounts of data in real time, there has been an increasing
interest in cryptography in the last decades. Usually, stream ciphers are used when a high encryption
speed is required or when the amount of data is unknown. In a stream cipher, bits or bytes are
encrypted individually and it is not necessary to store blocks of data before their processing, as typical
block ciphers do because they cannot directly cipher blocks that are shorter than their block size.
Because of this fact, stream ciphers usually have less stringent memory requirements than other kinds
of ciphers, which results in cheaper implementation in certain applications such as Internet of Things
(IoT) devices in wireless sensors networks (WSN). In these ciphers, a seed (key) is used in order to
generate a pseudorandom sequence (keystream). Each bit of this sequence is then combined with a bit
from the message using an XOR operation. To decrypt the message, an identical system with the same
seed is used to generate a duplicate keystream that is XORed with the encrypted message.
Some of the most promising stream ciphers use chaotic maps to generate the keystream. The main
advantage of these systems is that, due to their chaotic nature, they have the properties of ergodicity:
high sensitivity to the initial conditions and random-like behavior that are related to the properties of
confusion and diffusion that are considered to be essential in any cryptosystem [1]. Therefore, they are
usually capable of generating sequences with good random properties and a high sensitivity on the key.
Their main disadvantage is that these algorithms usually include some multiplications and divisions
that increase their complexity compared to other stream ciphers based on modular arithmetic.
On the other hand, it has been proven that, in order to be secure, stream ciphers should not
use the same key to encrypt several messages [2]. Furthermore, since the key should be difficult to
guess by an attacker, it is not advisable to use a predictable algorithm or a person to generate it.
Therefore, it is preferred to generate the key or seed using a True Random Number Generator
(TRNG). In this work, a chaos-based stream cipher that uses a MEMS (microelectromechanical system)
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accelerometer as a seed generator is proposed. Our motivation for using a MEMS accelerometer
as a TRNG comes from the fact that previous studies have shown that these devices are capable of
generating good random numbers [3]. Although other elements such as silicon resistors can also be
used as TRNGs, they typically require a big silicon area in order to be implemented and quite complex
post-processing [4,5]. Furthermore, MEMS accelerometers are cheap and are ubiquitously present in
many wireless devices (such as smartphones, wearable devices, laptops, drones, etc.), so it is possible
to reuse an element that is already available in the device [6]. In [7], a chaos-based cryptosystem with
a sensor based seed generator was preliminary advanced. However, in this work, the seed generation
block is analyzed in much more detail. Furthermore, a different stream cipher based on a hybrid
algorithm mixing Skew Tent Map and Linear Feedback Shift Register proposed in [8] has been adapted
for this application. The algorithm proposed in [8] has been improved, obtaining a higher throughput
while maintaining the same level of security.
A scheme of the proposed cryptosystem is shown in Figure 1. The proposed cryptosystem uses
a seed generator block composed by a commercially available accelerometer [9] and a conditioning stage.
Both systems are able to generate enough randomness, as is proven in the next sections. Using these
seeds, a chaotic stream cipher based on a Skew Tent Map (STM) and a Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) generates a keystream K that is XORed with the plaintext P in order to obtain the ciphertext C.
The whole stream cipher block has been implemented and tested in a Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA), obtaining a throughput of 1.072 Gbps. Regarding the seed generation, an in-depth analysis
of the viability of the system has been made. This analysis includes the capture of the accelerometer
signal at different sample rates and a study of its randomness properties. Furthermore, a conditioning
stage based on Secure Hash Algorithm 512 (SHA-512) [10] has been implemented in order to whitening
the raw sensor data.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the stream cipher algorithm in detail, as 
well as its implementation results and a comparison with other chaos-based stream ciphers; Section 
3 includes an analysis of the noise signal generated by a commercial accelerometer at rest as well as 
an explanation of the conditioning stage; Section 4 presents a cryptanalysis of the encryption system; 
finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
2. Stream Cipher Algorithm 
2.1. Skew Tent Map 
Most of the chaotic systems only present chaos for a certain set of initial parameters while other 
initial parameters lead to a periodic behavior that is not suitable for secure applications. The set of 
parameters that produces a chaotic behavior is not usually within a continuous region and it is often 
unknown [11]. The Logistic Map, despite being used in many of the proposed chaotic cryptosystems 
[12,13], presents this problem. As an example, a bifurcation diagram of the Logistic Map, which 
represents several consecutive values of the sequences ݔ௜ as a function of the chaotic parameter ߛ, 
is shown in Figure 2a. Most values of ߛ > 3.57 exhibit chaotic behavior but there are some regions 
Figure 1. Overview of the full cryptosystem, including a chaos-based stream cipher and a sensor-based
seed generator.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the stream cipher algorithm in detail, as well
as its implementation results and a comparison with other chaos-based stream ciphers; Section 3
includes an analysis of the noise signal generated by a commercial accelerometer at rest as well as
an explanation of the conditioning stage; Section 4 presents a cryptanalysis of the encryption system;
finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Stream Cipher Algorithm
2.1. Skew Tent Map
Most of the chaotic systems only present chaos for a certain set of initial parameters while other
initial parameters lead to a periodic behavior that is not suitable for secure applications. The set
of parameters that produces a chaotic behavior is not usually within a continuous region and it
is often unknown [11]. The Logistic Map, despite being used in many of the proposed chaotic
cryptosystems [12,13], presents this problem. As an example, a bifurcation diagram of the Logistic
Map, which represents several consecutive values of the sequences xi as a function of the chaotic
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parameter γ, is shown in Figure 2a. Most values of γ > 3.57 exhibit chaotic behavior but there are some
regions in white where the system presents a periodic behavior. Moreover, even in the chaotic regions
there exist an infinite number of initial conditions that lead to periodic cycles [14]. Several methods
have been capable to find some of the periodic windows [15,16], but the whole set of parameters that
produces periodic windows remains unknown. Therefore, it can be difficult to define the key space in
this type of systems.
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In our work, we based our encryption algorithm on a Skew Tent Map since it is one of the simplest
chaotic systems with a continuous region where all the parameters are capable of generating a chaotic
(non-periodic) sequence. The Skew Tent Map (Figure 2b) [17] is given by
f (xi) = xi+1 =
{
xi/γ xi ∈ [0,γ]
(1− xi)/(1− γ) xi ∈ (γ, 1] (1)
where x0 is the initial value of the {xi} sequence and γ, x0 ∈ (0, 1). For any value of x0 and γ, the map
exhibits a chaotic behavior, which makes it a good choice for a cryptosystem. Moreover, this algorithm
is quite simple although the division operation can be difficult to implement in some platforms such
as FPGA. Therefore, we suggest that the values of 1/γ and 1/(1− γ) should be calculated and saved
and the successive values of xi should be obtained using multiplications instead.
2.2. Increasing the Period Length
When the STM is implemented with a precision of n bits, there are only 2n possible values
for each xi and, for a given γ, each xi determines the next value xi+1. Therefore, the sequence will
become periodic and its maximum period will be 2n. However, the typical cycle lengths are found
experimentally to be much shorter. In order to increase the period, and therefore the security, of these
sequences, it is possible to slightly change the values of each xi (xi → x˜i) and use this modified x˜i to
obtain the next value of the sequence as xi+1 = f (x˜i). In our cryptosystem, the values of x˜i are obtained
by XORing the least significant bit (LSB) of each xi, x0i , with the least significant bit of an LFSR, y
0
i .
Using this method, the period of the sequence can be set up to be above a given value using the
following proposition, proven in [18].
Proposition 1: Given the binary sequences a(k), b(k) and c(k) = a(k)⊕ b(k), for k ∈ N and Pa, Pb
and Pc their respective periods. If Pb is prime, then Pc ≥ mPb with m ≥ 1.
Therefore, if we consider c(k) as the LSB of x˜i, x˜0i , a(k) as the LSB of xi, x
0
i , and b(k) as the output
bits, y0i , of an LFSR with a prime period Pb, the period of the {x˜i} sequence will be Pc ≥ Pb. In our
work, a 61-order LFSR has been used, which gives us a period of, at least, 261. This choice guarantees
that the period is big enough for our purposes (a sequence with a period of 261 transmitted at a speed
of 1 Gbps would take more than 73 years to repeat itself).
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2.3. Stream Cipher Algorithm
The schematic of the proposed stream cipher is shown in Figure 3. The principle of operation
is as follows: first, the accelerometer is used to generate the initial parameters of the STM, γ, x0
and the initial state of the LFSR, y0. Then, the encryption algorithm generates a pseudorandom
sequence {x˜i} using the STM algorithm (Figure 4) and XORing the LSB of each xi from the STM, x0i ,
with a pseudorandom bit generated by the LFSR, y0i . Furthermore, in order to increase the security of
our system, we have only used the eight least significant bits from each x˜i
(
x˜0i , x˜
1
i , . . . , x˜
7
i
)
to encrypt
the message. This way, we restrict the amount of information that an attacker could obtain, so that some
attacks such as a chaotic reconstruction of the map are harder to accomplish. Therefore, the message is
divided in 8-bit blocks, mi, and, after each iteration, these bits are combined with eight bits from x˜i
with an XOR gate.
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e receiver is also co ose of S a FS blocks. y si g t e sa e i itial ara eters
t at ere used o ncrypt the m ssage, he receiver is capable of r covering the original message
by combining its sequence with the encrypted sequence with an XOR gate. In our tests we have
directly introduced the same initial parameters in the transmitter and the receiver although, in a real
i le e tatio , t e i itial ara eters s o l be ge erate i t e tra s itter a se t to t e recei er
si g a sec re c a el. is could be easily accomplished using secure asym etric algorithms such as
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA).
3. Seed Generator
3.1. Noise Signal Analysis
In order to generate values for the initial parameters of the STM, γ and x0, as well as the initial state
of the LFSR, y0, the feasibility of a TRNG based on the capture of n ise produced by an accelerometer
at rest was studied. Sim lations have been done to test the propos d method. To g nerate random
numbers, the noise signal produced by means of the evaluation board EVAL-ADXL335Z has been used.
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This board contains a small low-energy three-axis accelerometer ADXL335 [9]. This accelerometer is
composed by a polysilicon surface-micromachined capacitive sensor and a conditioning electronic stage
that implements an open-loop measurement architecture. Acceleration deflects the moving mass and
unbalances the differential capacitor resulting in a sensor output whose amplitude is proportional to
acceleration. The phase-sensitive demodulation technique was then used to determine the magnitude
and direction of the acceleration. Some of its typical applications, such as mobile systems or sports and
health devices, are strongly related with IoT. The evaluation board was supplied with batteries to avoid
coupling 50 Hz or 60 Hz harmonics from the power supply network. AC signal of the measurements
of the acceleration in the X axis have been acquired by an oscilloscope at several sampling rates,
250, 25, 2.5, 0.25, and 0.1 kSps using a dynamic range of ±8 mV and 8-bit resolution. An example of
noise signal, obtained using a sample rate of 25 kSps is shown in Figure 5. To minimize the correlated
common noise, signals generated by the X and Y sensors have been subtracted.
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Figure 5. Sample random data generated by the accelerometer at rest, measured using a sample rate of
25 kSps.
The Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of this signal has been calculated to analyze the characteristics of
the noise (Figure 6). As can be seen, the obtained power spectral density decreases with the frequency
for low frequencies but it stays approximately constant (white noise) for high frequencies.
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Figure 6. Fast Fourier Transform of the sampled data.
Finally, it was tested if the noise generated by the accelerometer follows a Gaussian distribution,
which would be suitable for our application. Figure 7a shows a histogram of the data where it can
be seen that the distribution is approximately Gaussian. A normal distribution fit gives a mean of
µ = −0.42 mV and a standard deviation of σ = 0.43 mV. On the other hand, Figure 7b compares the
sensor data cumulative distribution function (CDF) with the standard normal CDF. As can be seen,
both cumulative distribution functions are very similar, which indicates that the sensor data is very
close to Gaussian noise.
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3.2. Random Bitstream Post-Processing
After sampling the signal noise, the DC level was eliminated and a sign detection was applied in
order to generate a raw bitstream (Figure 8). Once the raw bitstream for key generation was obtained,
its viability as a source of random numbers was analyzed. For this purpose, several bitstreams obtained
with different sampling rates were subjected to the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) SP 800-22 battery of test [19]. It was observed that none of the bitstream passed all of the NIST
tests. However, as the sampling rate decreased, more tests were met, improving the randomness of
the bitstream. NIST tests results are shown in Table 1. The list of applied tests with their numeration
is the following: Monobit Frequency Test (1), Block Frequency Test (2), Runs Test (3), Longest Runs
of Ones (4), Binary Matrix Rank (5), Spectral Test (6), Non Overlapping template Matching (7),
Overlapping Template Matching (8), Maurer’s Universal Statistic Test (9), Linear Complexity Test (10),
Serial Test (11), Approximate Entropy Test (12), Cumulative Sums Test (13), Random Excursions
Test (14), Random Excursions Variant Test (15), Cumulative Sums Test Reverse (16), and Lempel-Ziv
Compression Test (17).
Table 1. NIST test results for bitstreams obtained at different sample rates.
Bitstream Type Raw Bitstream Postprocessed Bitstream
Sampling (kSps) 250 25 2.5 0.25 0.1 All
NIST Test
1 x x x x x
√
2 x x
√
x
√ √
3 x x x
√ √ √
4 x x
√ √ √ √
5
√ √ √ √ √ √
6 x x
√ √ √ √
7 x x x
√
x
√
8 x x
√ √ √ √
9 x x
√ √ √ √
10
√
x
√ √ √ √
11 x x
√ √ √ √
12 x x
√
x
√ √
13 x x x x x
√
14
√ √ √ √ √ √
15
√
x
√ √ √ √
16 x x x x x
√
17 x x
√ √ √ √
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3.3. Mechanical Response of the Accelerometer 
Although these measurements were made with the accelerometer at rest, the mechanical 
response of the accelerometer in an IoT device can often surpass the noise signal. To solve this 
problem, three methods are proposed. 
First, since it is not necessary to generate the keys constantly, the system can generate keys only 
when the accelerometer is at rest. Currently, some algorithms exist that can detect when the 
Figure 8. Conceptual block diagram of the processing performed.
According to NIST recommendations, if it is known that the raw noise-source output is
biased, appropriate conditioning components can be included in the design to reduce that bias to
a tolerable level [20]. Furthermore, several vetted conditioning functions are listed, such as hash-based,
cipher-based, and cipher block chaining message authentication code (HMAC, CMAC, and CBC-MAC).
These basic cryptographic primitives are included in many security communication systems,
so their use for conditioning randomness sources might not result in extra hardware resources.
In case these functions are not available in the communication system, other conditioning techniques
can be applied. For example, easier digital techniques such as von Neuman de-biasing [21] can be used.
Other zero-bias noise methods such as the one proposed by Bagini-Bucci [22] or Stipcˇevic´ [23] can be
used, although the resulting analogue part of the conditioning stage would be more complex than that
presented in this article.
In this work, the raw bitstream has been post-processed using the Secure Hash Algorithm
512 (SHA-512) [10] algorithm. The SHA hashing family is one of the most popular techniques among
whiteners and is included on NIST listed HMAC conditioners [18]. After post-processing, it has
been observed that, at all sampling rates, the NIST randomness tests are passed. As an example,
Figure 9 shows the NIST test results before and after post-processing for a sequence obtained at
a sample rate of 2.5 kSps.
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3.3. Mechanical Response of the Accelerometer
Although these measurements were made with the accelerometer at rest, the mechanical response
of the accelero eter in an IoT device can often surpass the noise signal. To solve this problem,
three methods are proposed.
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First, since it is not necessary to generate the keys constantly, the system can generate keys
only when the accelerometer is at rest. Currently, some algorithms exist that can detect when the
accelerometer is at rest. Although these algorithms are usually used to put the device in sleep mode,
they could also be used to activate the key generation process [24].
Second, signal acquisition in inertial MEMS (such as an accelerometer) is usually based on the
synchronous demodulation technique, which requires an output low-pass filter to demodulate the
output signal and reduce the high frequency noise. Similarly, another path with a high-pass filter
could be included. This way, when the device was in a normal operation mode, the low-pass filter
path would be used while the system would switch to the patch with the high-pass filter in order to
generate the keys.
Third, most of the accelerometers include a Self-Test pin that, when set at a certain voltage,
the accelerometer presents a null response. Therefore, this feature could be used to stop the
accelerometer from generating the keys. For example, capacitive accelerometers use the force-feedback
technique to force the proof mass back to its rest position.
Finally, a combination of these solutions could be used. Further study is needed in order to
determine the best solution for each application.
4. Implementation Results
The proposed encryption algorithm including the transmitter and the receiver was implemented
in a Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA. In order to test the system, a part of the post-processed bitstream generated
by the sensor was used as the initial values of x0,γ and y0. To find a good compromise between
encryption speed and security, a 64-bit precision was used. Since γ and x0 are within the interval (0, 1)
they can be implemented easily on the FPGA using a fixed-point arithmetic. The resources used by
the transmitter, including the total number of lookup tables (LUTs), slice registers, and digital signal
processing blocks (DSPs), as well as the throughput obtained, are shown in Table 2. Furthermore,
the area, frequency, and throughput obtained by other chaotic stream ciphers implemented in similar
platforms are shown for comparison purposes.
Table 2. Comparison with Recent Published Chaos-Based Ciphers.
Device [25] [26] [27] [28] This Work
Platform Virtex 5 Virtex 6 Virtex 6 Virtex II Virtex 7
Main chaotic algorithm Logistic Map Henon Map Logistic Map Lorenz System Skew Tent Map
Key generation NA NA NA NA TRNG
LUTs 50 1600 643 2718 805
Registers 48 64 160 791 70
Total DSPs 9 16 16 40 1 16
Freq (MHz) 43.2 25.7 93 15.5 134
Throughput (Mbps) 43.2 25.7 1500 124 1072
Slices 2 25 408 181 1755 210
Mbps/slice 1.728 0.063 8.287 0.07065 5.105
1 Virtex II uses 18 × 18 multipliers instead of DSPs; 2 The number of slices has been estimated from the number of
Registers and LUTS, assuming unrelated logic.
Establishing a comparison between these systems is not straightforward since they have been
implemented in different platforms and it is difficult to analyze the level of security that each one
provides. For example, the cryptosystem proposed in [27] achieves a higher throughput than the
STM-LFSR algorithm but it is transmitting 16 bits instead of eight after each iteration, which may result
in a higher vulnerability. However, it can been seen that our system achieves higher performance area
ratio (Mbps/slice) than most of the other cipher systems.
After implementing the algorithm, we were able to encrypt and decrypt images efficiently.
As an example, Figure 10 shows an original and its encrypted images, and Figure 11 shows their
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respective histograms. The correlation between the original and the encrypted image in this case is
only 0.0020, indicating that both images are almost uncorrelated.
Moreover, in the present work, power consumption was also estimated. The FPGA manufacturer
power report utilities was used for this purpose. After doing post-implementation simulations,
the obtained dynamic power consumption at an operation frequency of 125 MHz (1 Gbps) was 60 mW,
which resulted in 60 pJ/bit.
This value is similar to the power consumption of other lightweight ciphers implemented in
FPGA, such as [29], where power consumption per ciphered bit is 155 pJ/bit in the AES block cipher
and 62 pJ/bit in the Present block cipher (It should be noticed that these ciphers were implemented in
a Xilinx 6 Series FPGA that typically presents a 25%–30% higher power consumption than a Xilinx
7 Series FPGA). However, these cipher systems achieve throughputs of 116 Mbps and 37.6 Mbps,
respectively, which are significantly lower than the throughput achieved by our system.
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5. Cryptanalysis
5.1. Randomness Tests
One of the requirements of a secure cryptosystem is that the output sequence should be
undistinguishable from the output of a truly random function for any key used [30]. In order to
verify that our stream cipher meets this condition, several sequences generated by different initial
conditions were subjected to the NIST tests. Furthermore, in order to see how the inclusion of the
LFSR to increase the period length affects the randomness of the sequences, some sequences generated
only by the STM were subjected to the same randomness tests. After analyzing several sequences,
we concluded that our algorithm was able to generate sequences with good randomness properties and
that the presence of the LFSR dramatically increases the randomness properties of the digitized STM.
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As an example, Figure 12 shows the NIST results for a particular sequence generated by the
STM and the STM-LFSR algorithms respectively. It can be seen that the sequence generated by the
STM-LFSR algorithm passes all of them, whereas the sequence generated by the STM only passes
seven out of 17 tests.Sensors 2017, 17, 646 10 of 13 
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5.2. Parameter Space
In order to analyze the security of our system, the parameter space that, in our system, is given
by γ, x0, and the initial state of the LFSR, y0 should be considered. First, all of the initial parameters
should generate sequences with random-like behavior. In our case, the usage of a chaotic system,
such as the Skew Tent Map (STM), which is chaotic for any initial parameters chosen in a continuum
range γ, x0 ∈ (0, 1), and the inclusion of an LFSR, which increases the period length of the sequences,
guarantees that our system meets this requirement.
On the other hand, the key space size κ should be big enough to prevent brute-force attacks.
Assuming a 64-bit precision and a 61st order LFSR, the total key space size obtained from counting
all possible combinations of values of γ, x0, and y0 is: κ = 264+64+61 = 2189. Although some popular
lightweight encryption systems such as [31] use 80-bit key sizes, some guidelines recommend that,
in order to prevent brute-force attacks in the following years, the key space size should be greater than
κ = 2112 [32,33]. Therefore, our key space can be considered to be big enough.
5.3. Sensitivity Dependence on the Key
A good cryptosystem should also present a high sensitivity dependence on the parameters to
prevent attackers from finding relationships between the parameters and their corresponding masking
sequences. Due to the chaotic nature of the STM, similar keys lead to very different sequences, so this
condition is satisfied.
In some chaotic systems with several parameters, when sums or subtractions are used, it is
possible to fix one of the parameters and find the others using a bit-error-rate (BER) attack [34].
However, this is not possible in the STM since there is a division of the parameters involved.
5.4. Sensitivity ependence on the Plaintext
ur cryptosyste , like ost of the strea ciphers, does not present a sensitivity dependence on
the plaintext since a single bit change on the plaintext only changes one bit of the ciphertext. This makes
the system vulnerable to some attacks, such as a differential known plaintext attack, if several messages
are encrypted using the same key. By using a MEMS inertial sensor to generate true random keys,
this problem is avoided.
Sensors 2017, 17, 646 11 of 13
5.5. Reconstruction of the Map
A possible attack for some chaotic stream ciphers consists of trying to reconstruct the map by
finding the initial parameters via analyzing the output sequence. For example, if an attacker knows
the value of xi and xi+1, he could use Equation (1) for f (xi−1) and f (xi) to calculate the values of
γ and xi−1.
This method, however, seems to be very difficult to be carry out successfully in our system.
First, we are only transmitting eight bits from each xi, so the information that a possible attacker
has is very limited. Therefore, if an attacker could somehow manage to obtain the last eight bits of
xi and xi+1, there would still be
(
256
)2
= 2112 possible values of xi and xi+1 that would have to be
tried. Furthermore, after each iteration, the LSB of each xi is XORed with a bit generated by an LFSR,
which makes the reconstruction even more difficult to accomplish.
Therefore, we can conclude that it is nearly impossible to reconstruct the chaotic map in
a reasonable amount of time.
6. Conclusions
In this work, a secure stream cipher system was proposed and tested. This system presents
a robust STM-LFSR architecture using a MEMS accelerometer with a conditioning stage to generate
true random keys. The stream cipher module was implemented in a Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA using a 64-bit
fixed point arithmetic. The stream cipher algorithm was implemented for a throughput of 1.072 Gbps
using 805 LUTs, 40 registers and 16 DSPs.
For the seed generation block, the usage of a MEMS accelerometer was studied. We proved that
the noise generated by this inertial MEMS accelerometer at rest has random properties, especially when
it is sampled at a low sampling rate. However, in order to pass all of the NIST tests, a conditioning stage
is necessary. In this work, SHA-512 function was used for this purpose, getting random sequences that
pass the NIST test.
An in-depth cryptanalysis was made studying different aspects of our cryptosystem such as
randomness, sensitivity dependence on the key and the plaintext, key space, and chaotic reconstruction
of the map. This study allows us to conclude that our system can be considered secure, i.e., the amount
of computation time needed to hack the cipher is impracticable with current computational equipment
and known cryptanalysis algorithms.
On the other hand, although a MEMS accelerometer was proposed to generate the keys,
other MEMS and microsensors, such as gyroscopes, light detectors, magnetic sensors, cameras, etc.,
which are often present in IoT devices, could have been used instead or in a combined way.
It is necessary to take into account that in real designs, one must take advantage of the presence
of several entropy sources to guarantee the generation of true random numbers. Relating this fact
with the low area and high security of our system, we can conclude that this system is suitable for
IoT applications.
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